Publikationen

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We use a large-scale internet experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers that are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We explore how subjects' performances depend on their opponents' learning algorithm. Furthermore, we test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation.

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Quantitative performance measurement is a controversial idea in the public sector. This paper argues that management by measurement is sensible if the measurement methods have a sufficient quality. In particular, quantitative performance measures have to address problems of gaming and monitoring intensity. I look at the assignment of negative weights to poor, but informative, performance measures even if these measures have a positive correlation with the non-contractible performance objective. In a simple agency relationship, I show how a poor measure with negative weight can serve as an indicator for manipulation. However, the benefits derived from a negative weight may come at the price of increased measurement risk. Healthcare and research organizations provide examples of how negative weights can improve performance measurement.

In this paper we examine the impact of reciprocal motives on decision-making in a committee. We show that each strategy profile that constitutes an equilibrium without reciprocity also represents an equilibrium under reciprocity. Under reciprocity, additional equilibria may exist. All of them imply lower material payoffs and lower overall utility for a large majority of members compared to equilibria that also represent equilibria without reciprocity. We discuss mechanisms such as incentive contracts that may eliminate the negative effects of reciprocity. In a dynamic framework we show that “psychological logrolling equilibria” may exist, where some agents perceive others as kind and therefore accept projects that are detrimental to themselves but beneficial to others.

We examine a search and matching model of the labor market with overlapping generations of workers. In this model, we focus on the effects of the finite lifetime of workers. As a result of finite lifetime very old workers with the same productivity as younger workers generally earn less. A market solution with Nash-bargained wages is never optimal as old workers search too long compared to the efficient solution. We also examine the effects of policy measures such as hiring subsidies or unemployment insurance on employment. Labor market institutions have a differential impact for different age groups.

In this paper, we investigate the effects of competition on bargained outcomes. We show that the neglect of either fairness concerns or decision errors will prevent a satisfactory understanding of how competition affects bargaining. We conducted experiments which demonstrate that introducing a small amount of competition to a bilateral ultimatum game by adding just one competitor induces large behavioral changes among responders and proposers, causing large changes in accepted offers. Models that assume that all people are self-interested and fully rational do not adequately explain these changes. We show that a model which combines heterogeneous fairness concerns with decision errors correctly predicts the comparative static effects of changes in competition. Moreover, the combined model is remarkably good at predicting the entire distribution of offers in many different competitive situations.

This paper considers the tax evasion decision when taxes constitute contributions to the financing of social insurance programs, such as un employment insurance. We call this evasion contribution evasion and establish that critical differences exist between contribution evasion and tax evasion, the central difference being that contributions entitle the contributor to future claims. Furthermore, we derive a recomme ndation for the reduction of contribution evasion, referring to the distinction between Bismarckian and Beveridgean social security systems.

This paper analyzes care incentives of individuals in a bilateral-harm setting if care choices are sequential. We find that the efficient outcome is not guaranteed under any liability rule considered, irrespective of whether information is perfect or imperfect. Furthermore, it is no longer possible to generally rank liability rules according to their induced social costs. These findings are in strong contrast to the sequential-torts setting in which harm is unilateral.