Publications

Game-theoretic analysis of relational contracts typically studies Pareto optimal equilibria. We illustrate how this equilibrium selection rules out very intuitive hold-up concerns in stochastic games with long-term decisions. The key problem is that Pareto optimal equilibria, even if satisfying renegotiation-proofness, do not reflect plausible concerns about how today’s actions affect future bargaining positions within the relationship. We propose and characterize an alternative equilibrium selection based on the notion that continuation play is repeatedly negotiated in a relationship. We illustrate with several examples how the concept naturally combines relational contracting and hold-up concerns.

We represent the dynamic relation among variables in vector autoregressive (VAR) models as directed graphs. Based on these graphs, we identify so-called strongly connected components (SCCs). Using this graphical representation, we consider the problem of variable choice. We use the relations among the strongly connected components to select variables that need to be included in a VAR if interest is in impulse response analysis of a given set of variables. Our theoretical contributions show that the set of selected variables from the graphical method coincides with the set of variables that is multi-step causal for the variables of interest by relating the paths in the graph to the coefficients of the ‘direct’ VAR representation. An empirical application illustrates the usefulness of the suggested approach: Including the selected variables into a small US monetary VAR is useful for impulse response analysis as it avoids the well-known ‘price-puzzle’.

This study aims to synthesize the extant research on the Born Global Firms (BGF) phenomenon, mainly focusing on the Asia Pacific region (APAC). We adopt the systematic literature review methodology to identify the main context-specific drivers (‘success factors’) and outcomes of BGFs’ accelerated internationalization and the challenges they face before, during, and after global expansion. The analysis and evaluation of relevant studies reveal several critical variables that need to be extensively investigated (separately and in tandem) by scholars in order to advance existing theories and, at the same time, explain the out-of-pattern behaviors of BGFs outside the typical ‘Western economy’ context. Among the core variables are international entrepreneurial orientation and culture adoption, organizational learning and networking strategies, global strategic human capital and network resources (as predictors of BGFs’ international performance) and resource constraints, institutional and cultural distances, and liabilities of newness, smallness, foreignness, outsidership, and emergingness (as constraints to BGFs’ success). By identifying the research gaps and proposing a comprehensive framework with promising avenues for future research into the phenomenon of BGFs from the APAC region, this study helps enhance our understanding of the global strategy formation and execution processes of international new ventures from ‘the East’ and stimulate interdisciplinary dialogue between international business, strategy, and entrepreneurship scholars.

Causal evidence for the effect of team size on performance is lacking despite the high relevance of this question. From an economic perspective, one would expect performance incentives to decrease with increasing team size, but the psychological phenomenon of peer effects could mitigate the free-rider problem. To analyze the behavioral implications due to changes in team size, we exploit a rich dataset from a controlled experiment with teams of either two or three participants of a university research project performing a real-effort task. Our study provides three main findings. First, increasing team size does not change team performance on average, which is a robust result, be it across performance dimensions and even when introducing pay inequality between two work periods. Second, positive performance spillovers from peer to peer alleviate the free-rider problem when team size increases. Third, changes in peer pressure due to changes in the transparency of others' performance could explain the variation in peer effects across team size. In contrast to discussions in previous literature, our evidence points to a potentially negative role of peer pressure for team performance. While lower peer pressure in teams of three allows for more positive performance spillovers, a high-skilled peer in a team of two seems to pressure the other team member to produce more mistakes instead of more work output in high quality.

We collect information about more than 5000 Prussian politicians, digitize administrative data on the provision of health-promoting public goods, and gather local-level information on workers’ movements to study why elites in industrializing countries implement policies that improve the health of the poor. Using county-level variation in elite structure, we present OLS and IV estimates, suggesting that elites improve access to health services due to pressure exerted by workers’ movements. By contrast, policies that prevent disease outbreaks are implemented without such pressure. Analyses of roll- call votes substantiate the findings of the county-level analysis.

Gender segregation of occupations and entire industries is widespread. The segregation could be the result of perceived job-specific productivity differences between men and women. It could also result from the belief that homogeneous teams perform better or from in-group bias of male or female recruiters. We investigate these explanations in two samples: students and personnel managers. The subjects bet on the productivity of teams that are homogeneous with respect to gender at the outset and then either remain homogeneous or become diverse. The teams work on tasks that differ with respect to gender stereotypes. We obtain similar results in both samples. Women are picked more often for the stereotypically female task, and men are picked more often for the stereotypically male task. Subjects believe that gender-diverse teams perform better, especially in the task with complementarities, and they display an own-gender bias. Elicited expectations about the bets of others reveal that subjects expect the gender stereotypes of tasks but underestimate others’ bets on diversity.

Politics is increasingly driven by identity cleavages, which also affect the discussion about inequality and redistribution. Typically, redistribution is meant to reduce inequality, implying that redistribution neither makes the rich richer nor the former poor the new rich. However, if identity affects redistribution, these limits might no longer be binding, and redistribution could further increase existing inequalities (making the rich richer) or reverse the income ordering to favor the once-poor (which can even be inequality increasing if redistribution is strong). In a laboratory experiment, we investigate redistribution via a novel smooth one-dimensional distribution mechanism that also allows for an increase or reversal of inequality. Decision-makers receive information about the recipients' political orientation, nationality, or seat number during the experiment, and we vary the structure and source of income inequality (income is either earned, random, or unfair). We find most choices of the decision-makers involve redistribution, with only 8 % of choices sticking with the status quo. While most redistribution choices reduce inequality, a larger share—(18 %)—increase inequality by making the rich richer, 13 % of choices reduce overall inequality but make the poor the new rich, and 9 % increase inequality by making the poor very rich. Thus, 40 % of decisions are redistributions that are typically unobserved in common redistribution designs. Ingroup favoritism is a strong motive for redistribution in general, and it is the most important motive for redistribution to increase or reverse inequality. Indeed, 85 % of the inequality-increasing or reversing decisions favor the ingroup. Complementary eye-tracking data show that decision-makers’ attention to information about the recipients’ groups and to poor outliers are related to higher levels of redistribution.

This paper examines the effect of trade-induced changes in Mexican labor demand on population growth and migration responses at the local level. It exploits cross-municipality variation in exposure to a change in trade policy between the United States and China that eliminated potential tariff increases on Chinese imports, negatively affecting Mexican manufacturing exports to the United States. Municipalities more exposed to the policy change, via their industry structure, experienced greater employment loss. In the five years following the change in trade policy, more exposed municipalities experience increased population growth, driven by declines in out-migration. Conversely, 6 to 10 years after the change in trade policy, exposure to increased trade competition is associated with decreased population growth, driven by declines in in-migration and return migration rates, and increased out-migration. The sluggish regional adjustment is consistent with high moving costs and transitions across sectors in the short term.

This paper studies how the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 changed counties’ market potential and influenced the economic geography of the USA. We compute shipment effective distances with and without the canal from each US county to each other US county and to international ports and compute the resulting change in market potential. The main elasticity would imply that a 1% increase in market potential led to a total increase of population by around 2.3% in 1940. We compute similar elasticities for wages, land values, and immigration from out of state. Tradable (manufacturing) industries react stronger than non-tradable (services) industries.