Publications

In the two-person sequential best shot game, first player 1 contributes to a public good and then player 2 is informed about this choice before contributing. The payoff from the public good is the same for both players and depends only on the maximal contribution. Efficient voluntary cooperation in the repeated best shot game therefore requires that only one player should contribute in a given round. To provide better chances for such cooperation, we enrich the sequential best shot base game by a third stage allowing the party with the lower contribution to transfer some of its periodic gain to the other party. Participants easily establish cooperation in the finitely repeated game. When cooperation evolves, it mostly takes the form of 'labor division,' with one participant constantly contributing and the other constantly compensating. However, in a treatment in which compensation is not possible, (more or less symmetric) alternating occurs frequently and turns out to be almost as efficient as labor division.

This paper examines the relationship between corruption and the composition of public expenditures. First, I derive a theoretical model that links the degree of corruption in a country - to be understood as the prevailing culture of corruption - to distortions in the budget composition. The transmission channel is a rent-seeking contest where firms from different sectors pay bribes to politicians and bureaucrats to influence public procurement decisions, which give rise to endogenous rents. I then test the implications of the theoretical model with a dataset covering 29 OECD countries over the 1996-2009 period. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the relative share of expenditures on categories that involve public procurement, high-technology goods, and non-competitive markets (health and environmental protection including waste management) increases with corruption. This distortion occurs at the expense of spending categories that do not involve public procurement (social protection and recretion, culture and religion).

In intergroup contests a manager advises and motivates her group’s members. Her rewards often depend on the subsequent contest expenditure of the members. I test whether such incentives undermine the credibility and effectiveness of a manager’s efforts. In the different experimental treatments the managers either benefit from very high or low expenditure or get a predetermined payment. The results show that different management incentives shape the expenditure of the group members even if managers have an advisory role only. However, group members follow recommendations more closely if management compensation is not linked to contest expenditures.

In Geng, Weiss, and Woff (2011), we pointed to the possibility that a voting mechanism may create or strengthen an entitlement effect in political-power holders relative to a random-appointment mechanism. This comment documents that such an effect, if it exists, is not robust.

Theoretical models predict that globalization changes the nature of collective bargaining. Yet, the extant empirical evidence is inconclusive. We investigate the influence of globalization on three aspects of collective bargaining (degree of decentralization, union density, extent of government intervention) in industrialized and transition countries. Our innovations over the existing empirical literature are (i) the reliance on a more comprehensive dataset (44 countries from 1980 to 2009) and (ii) the use of dynamic panel data estimators. We find that economic globalization has depressed unionization rates, while the extent of decentralization and government intervention in collective bargaining have not been affected.

Third parties such as trade associations often assist cartels by collecting and evaluating market behaviour at the firm level. Under incomplete information neutral market oversight helps to distinguish defecting from complying behaviour, increasing the effectiveness of punishments for defectors and increasing cartel persistence. We investigate how cartels sort themselves into different organizational forms and whether cartel enforcement can be improved by setting fines contingent on the organizational form. A fine reduction for firms operating without the help of a third party causes some cartels to switch to a less persistent organizational form. Two drawbacks of this fine differentiation are that some new cartels will arise and that some of the existing cartels will become more persistent as the need to punish defectors decreases. Our paper is the first in the marginal deterrence literature to identify this second effect.

The presented model demonstrates how the coexistence of reciprocal and selfish types influences the formation of employment relationships, their profitability, wage differentials, wage competition, and unemployment in the presence of moral hazard. Wage and profitability differentials result from the differences in workers’ reactions to the managers’ wage offers. Moreover, these behavioral differences affect managers’ preferences for worker types. Thus, managers might make higher offers to attract the preferred worker type in a competitive labor market with excess supply of labor compared to a situation without competition. The resulting competitive matching allocates favored reciprocal workers to reciprocal managers. Consequently, unemployment arises first among unfavored reciprocal and selfish workers, respectively.

We provide empirical evidence that US financial stress shocks (US-FSSs) are an important driver for economic dynamics and fluctuations in emerging market economies (EMEs). Applying a structural vector auto regression, we analyze the international transmission of US-FSSs to eight EMEs using monthly data from 1999 to 2012. US-FSSs are identified as unexpected changes in the financial conditions index of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Findings indicate that a typical EME experiences similar negative effects as the US economy in response to US-FSSs. Our results emphasize that the transmission through international financial interconnections is dominant, while contagion through trade is inessential. Further, with regard to fluctuations in real economic activity, US-FSSs are as important as all other external factors jointly. In general, US-FSSs represent a crucial driver for volatility in the emerging world; also at business cycle frequencies.

We propose a simple way to improve the efficiency of the average treatment effect on propensity score based estimators. As the weights become arbitrarily large for the propensity scores being close to one or zero, we propose to shrink the propensity scores away from these boundaries. Using a comprehensive Monte Carlo study we show that this simple method substantially reduces the mean squared error of the estimators in finite samples.